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Reducing project duration is a significant concern for many industries in the speed-to-market era. 
Numerous studies have examined the effects of project delivery methods on speeding up the process of 
construction. However, no study has quantitatively compared the effect of using different compensation 
strategies on schedule duration and schedule reduction. Using the data obtained from 175 international 
construction projects, this paper focuses on examining the influence of compensation strategy (lump sum 
versus reimbursable) on project duration while specifically taking into account the industry sector (heavy 
industrial versus light industrial). The results of the study provide empirical evidence that using a 
reimbursable compensation strategy can potentially shorten the procurement duration, construction 
duration, and overall project duration of heavy industrial projects. However, reimbursable contracting did 
not appear to reduce the project duration on light industrial projects. 
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In many industries, such as petrochemical and pharmaceutical, speed-to-market is a significant concern 
because companies can gain a distinct competitive advantage by producing products faster. Companies 
operating in these markets often rely on construction delivery methods that can reduce the cycle time and 
thus speed up the process of construction. These delivery methods often include design-build and fast 
track variations that may reduce the overall project duration by compressing the design and/or 
construction schedule by overlapping activities (Konchar and Sanvido 1998; Fazio et al. 1998; Williams 
1995; Songer et al. 2000). These delivery methods are in stark contrast to more traditional design-bid-
build methods, which consist of separate design, procurement, and construction processes that make 
overlapping of activities infeasible (Gordon, 1994). Traditional design-bid-build delivery methods are 
appropriate for projects that can be fully designed before procurement and construction begin, where 
uncertainty is low, and where most costs can be reasonably estimated by vendors and contractors during 
the bidding process. As a result, traditional design-bid-build methods may also employ a lump sum 
compensation strategy because costs may be more certain.  
Design-build methods, also known as engineer-procure-construct (EPC), on the other hand, may be 
appropriate when the client wishes to enter into an agreement with one party to complete both the design 
and the construction. It is also appropriate for complex projects that may require the early involvement of 
construction contractors who provide pre-construction services or expertise during the design process. 
Furthermore, design-build methods provide more flexibility during the early stages of a project by allowing 
construction to begin before the design has been completed, thus providing an opportunity to accelerate 
the schedule. As a result, EPC methods often employ a reimbursable compensation strategy because 
costs evolve as the design proceeds and, therefore, costs cannot be estimated with complete accuracy 
during the bidding process. 
A number of studies have compared the performance of design-bid-build delivery methods to design-
build (or EPC) and other delivery methods (Konchar and Sanvido, 1998; Fazio et al., 1998; Williams, 
1995; Songer et al., 2000). Surprisingly, few studies have focused on the differences in performance 
achieved when using various compensation strategies. Specifically, no study has quantitatively compared 
the schedule performance of lump sum and reimbursable compensation strategies to determine whether 
one strategy outperforms the other. For example, there is a pervasive belief in the heavy industrial sector 
that reimbursable compensation strategies are more appropriate for use on schedule-driven projects for a 
number of reasons, including (Menches and Chen 2011): (1) a willingness by the contractor to supply 
more labor because labor costs are reimbursed by the client; (2) the contractor can start the construction 
work while design is still in progress because the client will reimburse any re-work costs that might arise 
from design changes; (3) the contractor will be more flexible about where and when they perform certain 
tasks, thus allowing the client to re-direct efforts when opportunities arise; and, (4) the client is involved in 
controlling the work alongside the contractor because reimbursable compensation entails using open-
book accounting methods and transparent reporting. Consequently, the belief that a reimbursable 
compensation strategy may facilitate a shorter project duration is common in the industrial sector but has 
never been empirically tested. 
This paper presents the results of a quantitative analysis of the differences in project duration for the 
design, procurement, and construction phases – as well as the overall project duration – when a lump 
sum versus a reimbursable compensation strategy is used. Drawing on theory developed during an 
extensive qualitative study on reimbursable contracting practices, the researchers analyzed empirical 
data from international construction projects to test the theory that reimbursable contracting was a more 
suitable strategy for use on schedule-driven projects than a lump sum strategy. The dataset consisted of 
175 international capital projects that were completed between 1998 and 2009. The study focused on 
examining the influence of compensation strategy on project duration while specifically taking into 
account the industry sector (i.e., heavy industrial and light industrial/pharmaceutical) to answer the 
question, “Does the use of a reimbursable compensation strategy tend to result in a shorter project 
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2.1. Lump Sum and Cost-Reimbursable Contracting Strategies Defined 
A contract is an agreement between two or more parties that has specific terms in which there is a 
promise to perform the defined work in return for a specified payment. Although there are a number of 
different types of pricing strategies associated with contracts, the two most common are fixed price and 
reimbursable contracts. Fixed price contracts generally include lump sum and unit price contracts, while 
cost reimbursable contracts consist of a number of variations based on their fee structure, including Cost 
Plus Percentage Fee, Cost Plus Fixed Fee, Cost Plus Fee with a Guaranteed Maximum Price, and 
Convertible Reimbursable Contracts (Cibinic And Nash, 2005; Clough et al., 2005; Menches and Chen, 
2011). 
 A contract is also a risk management instrument (Gould, 2003). The terms of the contract will outline 
each party’s rights and responsibilities, leading to an agreement about how risks are allocated between 
parties. Many owners prefer to allocate most of the risk to the contractor using a firm fixed price contract. 
However, when it is financially infeasible to allocate most of the risk to the contractor (i.e., the proposed 
cost will be too expensive), or when much more flexibility is needed during the construction process (for 
example, when the owner expects scope and design changes to occur during the construction phase), 
the owner may elect to use a reimbursable contracting strategy.  
In a lump sum contract, the contractor agrees to perform all the work stipulated in the contract by 
charging the owner a fixed sum of money (Clough et al., 2005). Typically, the contractor’s fixed price 
includes all labor, materials, project overhead, company overhead, profit, and a contingency for unknown 
conditions (Gordon, 1994). Furthermore, in a lump sum contracting environment, the contractor bears the 
risk of cost and schedule overruns and may have to assign more labor and expend more money to 
achieve the agreed-upon duration, resulting in a potential loss of, or reduction in, profit. As a result, this 
type of contract is suitable for projects in which the scope of work can be described with a high level of 
certainty at the time of contracting, thus allowing the contractor to estimate the cost of the work with 
reasonable accuracy (Menches and Chen, 2011).    
In a cost reimbursable contract, the owner will reimburse the contractor for all actual labor and 
materials costs and will pay the contractor a fee to cover overhead and profit (Clough et al., 2005).  
Consequently, the owner bears most of the cost and schedule risk in a reimbursable contracting 
environment and may direct the contractor to assign more labor to achieve the agreed-upon duration, 
which occurs at the owner’s expense. As a result, this type of contract is suitable for projects in which the 
scope of work cannot be described with a high level of certainty at the time of contracting (Menches and 
Chen, 2011). Furthermore, cost reimbursable contracts may be suitable for projects (1) where the scope 
and specifications evolve over the duration of the project, (2) when significant changes in the design are 
expected (O’Toole and Jergeas, 2010), or (3) where fast track or phased construction is needed 
(Department of the Army 1993).  
Research by Menches and Chen (2011) identified other characteristics of projects that make the 
project particularly well suited for cost reimbursable contracting. For example, cost reimbursable contracts 
are appropriate for use on projects with numerous risks that are unknown or unquantifiable – risks that 
are subject to greater than usual uncertainty, and thus make it difficult for a contractor to price the work 
with any degree of accuracy. Reimbursable contracts are also suitable for use on projects in which the 
time, performance, and quality objectives outweigh the relative cost. And, reimbursable contracts are 
suitable for use on projects in which the owner wants to have daily, weekly, or constant input into the 
decision making process, and when the owner desires regular feedback from the contractor. Finally, the 
owner who chooses to employ reimbursable contracting may be especially interested in promoting 
positive long-term relationships among exchange parties while eliminating or minimizing adverse 
relationships. Consequently, there are circumstances that might make lump sum or reimbursable 
contracting the more suitable option, and exchange parties should be aware of which option might 
produce better outcomes. 
 
2.2. Review of Project Duration Studies 
Project duration has been the focus of a significant number of studies, particularly quantitative studies 
that have attempted to predict construction duration or compare typical durations among different delivery 
methods. While these studies are too numerous to exhaustively discuss in this article, a few are 
highlighted to demonstrate the range of issues addressed in prior research. No study has attempted to 
test existing beliefs about the relationship between (1) how a contractor is compensated for their work 
and (2) how long it takes them to complete the project. This articles attempts to clarify this relationship. 
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Numerous studies have attempted to predict actual construction duration based on a number of 
variables such as project type (heavy construction, light construction, building construction, or 
infrastructure), project size (square feet or floor area), and project budget. These studies have used 
statistical regression (Abu Hammad et al., 2010), neural network models (Chen and Huang, 2006), 
optimization methods (Choi et al., 2011; Koo et al., 2010), and other techniques to predict a project’s 
duration. The alternative to predicting duration is to measure and compare actual duration following 
completion of the project. Numerous studies have measured and compared project duration between 
different delivery methods, with some studies arguing that project execution time can be reduced by using 
a design-build project delivery method rather than a different delivery method (Songer and Molenaar, 
1996; Konchar and Sanvido, 1998; Hale et al., 2009). Songer and Molenaar (1996) specifically noted that 
the primary reason owners select design-build as the delivery method was the potential to reduce the 
project’s duration. Konchar and Sanvido (1998) also concluded that using a design-build project delivery 
method can achieve shorter schedules. Hale et al. (2009) analyzed empirical data from two samples of 
very similar NAVFAC projects, where one sample contained 39 design-bid-build projects and the other 
sample contained 38 design-build projects. Statistical analysis indicated that the total project duration for 
a design-build project was shorter than for a design-bid-build project for the sample.  
Finally, a more general approach taken by the Construction Industry Institute involves the 
measurement of actual schedule performance, followed by the development of a metric called Project 
Schedule Growth that conceptualizes schedule performance (i.e., completion ahead of or behind 
schedule) as the ratio of (1) the difference between actual project duration and predicted project duration 
to (2) predicted project duration, where a negative ratio indicates better-than-expected schedule 
performance (CII, 2005). 
In summary, previous studies have largely investigated (1) the use of statistical analysis to predict 
project duration, and (2) the measurement and comparison of actual schedule duration between different 
delivery methods, but, as mentioned, no study has investigated the relationship between compensation 
structure (i.e., lump sum or reimbursable payment) and project duration to determine whether a cost 
reimbursable environment consistently produces a shorter project duration. Consequently, this paper 
presents the results of an empirical comparison of lump sum and reimbursable compensation strategies 
to determine if one strategy is more conducive than the other to shortening the project’s duration.  
 
3. Research Methodology 
The study used actual project duration data combined with quantitative analysis to address the 
research question, “Does the use of a reimbursable compensation strategy tend to result in a shorter 
project duration than the use of a lump sum compensation strategy?”   
 
3.1. Data Collection, Preparation and Presentation 
Data for the analysis was extracted from an existing database of completed international design and 
construction projects provided by the Construction Industry Institute. The projects that were extracted 
were completed between 1998 and 2009, and the dataset for this study initially included a total of 1,324 
completed projects from the heavy industrial, light industrial, building, and infrastructure sectors. These 
data were further filtered in accordance with the specific criteria identified in this section to select 175 
projects for this analysis.  
The projects in the database were reported by (1) owners, (2) contractors who performed design only, 
(3) contractors who performed construction only, and (4) contractors who performed both the design and 
the construction for the project. To avoid having a significant amount of missing data, only projects that 
included information on the duration of the design phase, procurement phase, and the construction phase 
of the work were selected for analysis. Two groups of data were compared: (1) lump sum projects, in 
which lump sum compensation was used for detailed design, procurement, and construction; and, (2) 
cost reimbursable projects, in which cost reimbursable compensation was used for detailed design, 
procurement, and construction. For convenience, we label these as “pure lump sum” and “pure 
reimbursable” projects because all three phases (design, procurement, and construction) were 
implemented using a single compensation strategy (either lump sum or reimbursable).  
A project with a total project cost of $5 million or greater was categorized as a large project (Liao, 
2008) and projects with a total cost that is less than $5 million was categorized as a small project. Due to 
the limited number of small projects in the database, the analysis used only data from large projects, 
whose total project costs ranged from $5 million to $500 million.  
WORKING PAPER 
Submitted to the KSCE Journal of Civil Engineering, May 2012 
5 
Based on these two criteria (pure lump sum/pure reimbursable and size), a total of 204 projects that 
were completed between 1998 and 2009 were initially selected for analysis. Because the majority of 
projects in the dataset were from the heavy and light industrial sectors, other types of projects were 
eliminated from the analysis. Consequently, the study analyzed projects from two major industry groups: 
heavy industrial and light industrial. Hence, data analysis was performed using heavy and light industrial 
projects and lump sum and cost reimbursable compensation strategies, resulting in the analysis of 175 
projects. Table 1 summarizes the projects by respondent type versus compensation type and Table 2 
summarizes the projects by industry group versus compensation type.  
 




Lump Sum Reimbursable 
    Owner 40 78 118 
    Contractor 27 30 57 
    Total 67 108 175 
 
Table 2. Sample Summarized by Compensation Type and Industry Group  
     Industry Group 
Compensation Type 
Total  
Lump Sum Reimbursable 
     Heavy Industrial 39 78 117 
     Light Industrial 28 30 58 
     Total 67 108 175 
 
From Table 1, it is worth noting that owners reported on twice as many projects as contractors (118 
versus 57, respectively). From Table 2, heavy industrial projects account for twice as many projects as 
light industrial (117 versus 58, respectively), and reimbursable contracts are employed more frequently 
than lump sum contracts for heavy industrial projects (78 versus 39, respectively) but both reimbursable 
and lump sum contracts are used almost equally for light industrial projects. 
 
3.2. Description of the Analytical Methods  
The analytical methods used in this study consisted of (1) descriptive statistics and (2) hypothesis 
testing using two-way analysis of variance (two-way ANOVA). As shown in Table 2, the descriptive 
statistics were summarized for industry group (heavy and light industrial) by compensation type (lump 
sum and reimbursable). Hypothesis testing essentially tested whether there was a difference in the 
average project duration for heavy industrial projects that used a lump sum compensation strategy versus 
a reimbursable compensation strategy. Likewise, a similar comparison was made for light industrial 
projects. Fundamentally, what the analysis was testing was whether lump sum or reimbursable 
compensation strategies resulted in: (1) a shorter Overall Project Duration (including detailed design, 
procurement, and construction), (2) a shorter Detailed Design Duration, (3) a shorter Procurement 
Duration, and (4) a shorter Construction Duration. The significance level (the criterion used for rejecting 
the null hypothesis that there is no difference in duration) selected for this analysis was set at 0.05. Two-
way ANOVA was used for the analyses because it enables the analyzers to look at two factors 
simultaneously (industry group and compensation strategy) and how project duration differs for these 
factors. The use of two-way ANOVA resulted in the development of the following hypotheses:  
1. Hypothesis 1 (H1): “Overall Project Duration” is shorter when a reimbursable compensation strategy 
is used than when a lump sum compensation strategy is used. The belief is that the contractor is 
willing to supply as many resources as necessary to meet more aggressive schedule goals because 
the client is paying for all direct labor and material costs. 
2. Hypothesis 2 (H2): “Detailed Design Duration” is longer when a reimbursable compensation strategy 
is used rather than when a lump sum compensation strategy is used. The belief is that the contractor 
will take more time to develop accurate design drawings in order to decrease re-work and change 
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orders during the construction phase, and, furthermore, the extra labor hours will be reimbursed by 
the client.  
3. Hypothesis 3 (H3): “Procurement Duration” is shorter when a reimbursable compensation strategy is 
used rather than when a lump sum compensation strategy is used. The belief is that the contractor 
will focus less attention on getting the best cost (which may require a longer procurement period and 
a longer price evaluation process) because the owner will reimburse all procurement costs. Instead, 
the contractor will focus on procuring materials and services that can be obtained sooner while still 
achieving high quality.   
4. Hypothesis 4 (H4): “Construction Duration” is shorter when a reimbursable compensation strategy is 
used rather than when a lump sum compensation strategy is used. Again, like Hypothesis 1, the 
belief is that the contractor will provide as many resources as necessary to meet aggressive schedule 
goals because the client is paying for labor and material costs.   
Two-way ANOVA relies on four underlying assumptions: (1) the outcome variable (duration) is at 
least interval scaled (i.e., a continuous number, or nearly continuous where the distance between 
adjacent points on the scale are equal); (2) the samples (projects) are randomly selected from the 
population; (3) the outcome variable (duration) is normally distributed for each of the populations (heavy 
industrial-lump sum, heavy industrial-reimbursable, light industrial-lump sum, and light industrial-
reimbursable); and, (4) the population variances of the outcome variable (duration) are the same for each 
of the populations. Consequently, the analyzers determined that the first and second assumptions were 
satisfied in the sample analyzed. The histograms and Q-Q plots (i.e., comparison of probability 
distributions) for three of the outcome variables (i.e., “Overall Project Duration”, “Procurement Duration” 
and “Construction Duration”) show that the data were normally distributed for each of these populations. 
However, a positive skew was detected in the distribution of the outcome variable Detailed Design 
Duration. As a result, a logarithmic transformation was performed to normalize the distribution, where the 
logarithmic transformation is a common approach to meet the normality assumption for statistical 
analysis. Howell (2010) addressed the issue of reporting transformed data. Although it is appropriate to 
run a statistical test, such as the analysis of variance, on the transformed values, it is customary to report 
the results in the units of the untransformed scale. This is especially true when the original units are 
intrinsically meaningful. Therefore, a better approach is to convert all data to logs (if a logarithmic 
transformation is used), find the mean of those log values, and then take the antilog to convert the mean 
back to the original units.  
Finally, Levene’s test was conducted to test whether the samples had equal variances for each of the 
populations. The null hypothesis for Levene’s test is that the samples have equal variances. If the p-value 
of Levene’s test is greater than 0.05, the assumption of homogeneity of variance is met. The test results 
show that each of the outcome variables has equal variances for each of the populations because all the 
p-values are greater than 0.05 (Table 3). 
One of the major benefits of two-way ANOVA is that it allows researchers to examine the interaction 
of two factors in addition to the main effects (the effects of factors taken individually) (Howell, 2010). In 
this study, two-way ANOVA enabled the analyzers to examine the main effects of industry group and 
compensation type, respectively, on project duration as well as the interaction effect of compensation 
type by industry group on project duration. The presence of an interaction means that there are different 
compensation strategy effects for the two industry groups, where the compensation strategy may result in 
shorter or longer durations for heavy or light industrial projects. As a result, it is important to examine 
whether the general compensation strategy effect applies equally to heavy industrial as well as light 
industrial projects.     
 
Table 3. Test Results of Homogeneity of Variance  
Outcome Variables Levene Statistic Significance Met Assumption 
Overall Project Duration 2.591 0.057 Yes 
Log (Design Duration) 2.508 0.063 Yes 
Procurement Duration 0.817 0.488 Yes 
Construction Duration 0.649 0.585 Yes 
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3.3. Descriptive Statistical Analysis Results 
The description of the schedule duration by project phase, by industry type, and by compensation 
strategy is presented in Table 4. The outcome variables included four types of schedule duration: (1) 
Overall Project Duration, (2) Detailed Design Duration, (3) Procurement Duration, and (4) Construction 
Duration. For the heavy industrial projects that used a lump sum compensation strategy, (1) the 
minimum “Overall Project Duration” was 39 weeks and the maximum was 204 weeks, with a mean of 123 
weeks; (2) the minimum “Detailed Design Duration” was 13 weeks and the maximum was 182 weeks, 
with a mean of 58 weeks; (3) the minimum “Procurement Duration” was 22 weeks and the maximum was 
129 weeks, with a mean of 77 weeks; and, (4) the minimum “Construction Duration” was 33 weeks and 
the maximum was 139 weeks, with a mean of 91 weeks. For the heavy industrial projects that used a 
reimbursable compensation strategy, (1) the minimum “Overall Project Duration” was 49 weeks and the 
maximum was 162 weeks, with a mean of 90 weeks; (2) the minimum “Detailed Design Duration” was 22 
weeks and the maximum was 95 weeks, with a mean of 55 weeks; (3) the minimum “Procurement 
Duration” was 15 weeks and the maximum was 112 weeks, with a mean of 55 weeks; and, (4) the 
minimum “Construction Duration” was 9 weeks and the maximum was 122 weeks, with a mean of 58 
weeks.  
 
Table 4. Summary of Project Duration (in weeks) 







Overall Project Duration     
Heavy Industrial-Lump sum 39 204 123 130 
Heavy Industrial-Reimbursable 49 162 90 88 
Light Industrial-Lump sum 28 163 82 85 
Light Industrial-Reimbursable 53 172 106 98 
Detailed Design Duration     
Heavy Industrial-Lump sum 13 182 58 66 
Heavy Industrial-Reimbursable 22 95 55 56 
Light Industrial-Lump sum 12 126 29 27 
Light Industrial-Reimbursable 17 112 51 52 
Procurement Duration     
Heavy Industrial-Lump sum 22 129 77 75 
Heavy Industrial-Reimbursable 15 112 55 50 
Light Industrial-Lump sum 9 84 39 31 
Light Industrial-Reimbursable 30 139 74 71 
Construction Duration     
Heavy Industrial-Lump sum 33 139 91 94 
Heavy Industrial-Reimbursable 9 122 58 54 
Light Industrial-Lump sum 17 157 61 52 
Light Industrial-Reimbursable 19 130 76 74 
 
Consequently, for heavy industrial projects, (1) the mean “Overall Project Duration” for projects that 
used a reimbursable compensation strategy was 27% shorter than for projects that used a lump sum 
compensation strategy; (2) the mean “Detailed Design Duration” for projects that used a reimbursable 
compensation strategy was almost the same as projects that used a lump sum compensation strategy; (3) 
the mean “Procurement Duration” for projects that used a reimbursable compensation strategy was 29% 
shorter than for projects that used a lump sum compensation strategy; and, (4) the mean “Construction 
Duration” for projects that used a reimbursable compensation strategy was 36% shorter than for projects 
that used a lump sum compensation strategy. 
For the light industrial projects that used a lump sum compensation strategy, (1) the minimum 
“Overall Project Duration” was 28 weeks and the maximum was 163 weeks, with a mean of 82 weeks; (2) 
the minimum “Detailed Design Duration” was 12 weeks and the maximum was 126 weeks, with a mean of 
29 weeks; (3) the minimum “Procurement Duration” was 9 weeks and the maximum was 84 weeks, with a 
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mean of 39 weeks; and, (4) the minimum “Construction Duration” was 17 weeks and the maximum was 
157 weeks, with a mean of 61 weeks. For the light industrial projects that used a reimbursable 
compensation strategy, (1) the minimum “Overall Project Duration” was 53 weeks and the maximum was 
172 weeks, with a mean of 106 weeks; (2) the minimum “Detailed Design Duration” was 17 weeks and 
the maximum was 112 weeks, with a mean of 51 weeks; (3) the minimum “Procurement Duration” was 30 
weeks and the maximum was 139 weeks, with a mean of 74 weeks; and, (4) the minimum “Construction 
Duration” was 19 weeks and the maximum was 130 weeks, with a mean of 76 weeks.  
Consequently, for light industrial projects, (1) the mean “Overall Project Duration” for projects that 
used a reimbursable compensation strategy was 29% longer than for projects that used a lump sum 
compensation strategy; (2) the mean “Detailed Design Duration” for projects that used a reimbursable 
compensation strategy was 76% longer than for projects that used a lump sum compensation strategy; 
(3) the mean “Procurement Duration” for projects that used a reimbursable compensation strategy was 
90% longer than for projects that used a lump sum compensation strategy; and, (4) the mean 
“Construction Duration” for projects that used a reimbursable compensation strategy was 25% longer 
than for projects that used a lump sum compensation strategy.  
This descriptive statistical analysis highlights two trends. For the heavy industrial projects, the use of 
reimbursable compensation strategies may result in a shorter “Overall Project Duration”, a shorter 
“Procurement Duration”, and a shorter “Construction Duration.” In contrast, for light industrial projects, the 
use of lump sum compensation strategies may result in a shorter “Overall Project Duration”, a shorter 
“Detailed Design Duration,” a shorter “Procurement Duration”, and a shorter “Construction Duration.” The 
next section presents the results of the inferential statistical analysis in which the researchers tested the 
four hypotheses to determine whether reimbursable compensation strategies are more appropriate for 
projects that are schedule-driven.   
 
3.4. Hypothesis Testing and Findings  
Two-way ANOVA was used to test the previous four research hypotheses to determine if a reimbursable 
compensation strategy is more suitable for schedule-driven projects than a lump sum compensation 
strategy. 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): “Overall Project Duration” is shorter when a reimbursable compensation 
strategy is used than when a lump sum compensation strategy is used. 
 
A 2×2 ANOVA was conducted to evaluate the effects of two industry project types (heavy industrial 
and light industrial) and two compensation strategies (lump sum and reimbursable) on “Overall Project 
Duration.” The means and standard deviations for each of the combination groups are presented in Table 
5. The results for the ANOVA indicated a non-significant main effect for industry project types (p = 0.14 > 
p = 0.05), which means that the industry project type alone (heavy industrial or light industrial) does not 
have a significant effect on “Overall Project Duration.” It also indicated a non-significant main effect for 
compensation strategy (p = 0.58 > p = 0.05), which means that the type of compensation strategy alone 
(lump sum or reimbursable) does not have a significant effect on “Overall Project Duration.”  However, the 
results indicated a significant interaction between industry project type and compensation strategy (p < 
0.001), which means that the average “Overall Project Duration” for heavy industrial projects and for light 
industrial projects is significantly different for lump sum and reimbursable compensation strategies. In 
fact, an examination of the means in Table 5 indicates that for heavy industrial projects, the mean 
“Overall Project Duration” for projects that use a reimbursable compensation strategy is shorter than for 
projects that use a lump sum compensation strategy. But for light industrial projects, the trend is the 
reverse: the mean “Overall Project Duration” for projects that use a reimbursable compensation strategy 
is longer than for projects that use a lump sum compensation strategy. Therefore, the type of 
compensation strategy implemented may influence the “Overall Project Duration” differently for heavy and 
light industrial projects, and, consequently, a statistical test was performed to determine whether the 
duration is significantly shorter for heavy industrial projects that used reimbursable compensation 
strategies and whether the duration is significantly longer for light industrial projects that used 
reimbursable compensation strategies.    
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Table 5. Mean and Standard Deviation for Overall Project Duration (in weeks) 
Industry Group Compensation Strategy Mean SD 
Heavy Industrial Lump Sum 123 44 
 Reimbursable 90 28 
Light Industrial Lump Sum 82 38 
 Reimbursable 106 30 
 
To probe whether the difference in the average “Overall Project Duration” was statistically shorter for 
heavy industrial projects that implemented reimbursable versus lump sum compensation strategies, the 
simple main effect of compensation strategy on average “Overall Project Duration” was examined using a 
within-group analysis approach. The significance level was reduced to 0.025 to control for Type I error, 
where a Type I error occurs when one rejects the null hypothesis when it is true, and the analysis 
indicated that the difference in the “Overall Project Duration” for heavy industrial projects that 
implemented reimbursable versus lump sum compensation strategies was, in fact, statistically shorter (p 
= 0.002 < p = 0.025). This finding thus supports Hypothesis 1.  
A similar analysis was conducted to determine whether the difference in the average “Overall Project 
Duration” was statistically longer for light industrial projects that implemented reimbursable versus lump 
sum compensation strategies, and no statistically significant difference was noted (p = 0.027 > p = 0.025).  
However, because the p-value (p = 0.027) is close to the significance threshold (p = 0.025), the results 
are essentially inconclusive. In other words, it cannot be concluded with complete certainty that the 
average “Overall Project Duration” was not statistically longer.  
Generally, the analysis indicated that the type of compensation strategy implemented on heavy 
industrial projects had a significant impact on “Overall Project Duration,” where reimbursable 
compensation resulted in a shorter duration.  
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): “Detailed Design Duration” is longer when a reimbursable compensation 
strategy is used rather than when a lump sum compensation strategy is used. 
 
A 2×2 ANOVA was conducted to evaluate the effects of two industry project types (heavy industrial 
and light industrial) and two compensation strategies (lump sum and reimbursable) on “Detailed Design 
Duration.” The means and standard deviations for each of the combination groups are presented in Table 
6. The results for the ANOVA indicated a statistically significant main effect for industry project type (p = 
0.001 < p = 0.05), which means that the type of industry project (heavy or light industrial) has a significant 
effect on “Detailed Design Duration.” It also indicated a statistically significant main effect for 
compensation strategy (p = 0.015 < p = 0.05), which means that the type of compensation strategy (lump 
sum or reimbursable) has a significant effect on “Detailed Design Duration.” Furthermore, the results 
indicated a statistically significant interaction between industry project type and compensation strategy (p 
= 0.004 < p = 0.05), which means the average “Detailed Design Duration” for heavy industrial projects 
and for light industrial projects is significantly different for lump sum and reimbursable compensation 
strategies. An examination of the means in Table 6 indicates that for heavy industrial projects, the 
average “Detailed Design Duration” for projects that implemented a reimbursable compensation strategy 
is shorter than for projects that implemented a lump sum strategy, but for light industrial projects, the 
trend is the reverse: the average “Detailed Design Duration” for projects that implemented a reimbursable 
compensation strategy is longer than for projects that implemented a lump sum strategy. Therefore, the 
type of compensation strategy implemented may influence the “Detailed Design Duration” differently for 
heavy and light industrial projects, and, consequently, a statistical test was performed to determine 
whether the duration is significantly shorter for heavy industrial projects that used reimbursable 
compensation strategies and whether the duration is significantly longer for light industrial projects that 
used reimbursable compensation strategies.    
To investigate whether the difference in the average “Detailed Design Duration” is statistically shorter 
for heavy industrial projects that implemented reimbursable versus lump sum compensation strategies, 
the simple main effect of compensation strategy on average “Detailed Design Duration” was examined 
using a within-group analysis approach. The significance level was again reduced to 0.025 to control for 
Type I error, and the analysis indicated that the difference in the “Detailed Design Duration” for heavy 
industrial projects that implemented reimbursable versus lump sum compensation strategies was not 
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statistically shorter (p = 0.735 > p = 0.025). Thus, the mean “Detailed Design Duration” for heavy 
industrial projects that used a reimbursable compensation strategy was similar to, rather than significantly 
shorter than, projects that used a lump sum compensation strategy.  
 
Table 6. Mean and Standard Deviation for Detailed Design Duration (in weeks) 
Industry Group Compensation Strategy Mean* SD** 
Heavy Industrial Lump Sum 58 NA 
 Reimbursable 55 NA 
Light Industrial Lump Sum 29 NA 
 Reimbursable 51 NA 
* The mean of Detailed Design Duration is obtained by taking the antilog of transformed value to convert 
the mean back to the original units.  
**SD is not available as converting standard deviations will create unjust results.  
 
A similar analysis was conducted to determine whether the difference in the average “Detailed Design 
Duration” was statistically longer for light industrial projects that implemented reimbursable versus lump 
sum compensation strategies. The analysis indicated that the difference in the average “Detailed Design 
Duration” for light industrial projects that implemented reimbursable versus lump sum compensation 
strategies was, in fact, statistically longer (p = 0.001 < p = 0.025), thus supporting Hypothesis 2.  
Overall, the analysis indicated that the type of compensation strategy implemented on light industrial 
projects had a significant impact on “Detailed Design Duration,” where reimbursable compensation 
resulted in a longer duration. 
    
Hypothesis 3 (H3): “Procurement Duration” is shorter when a reimbursable compensation 
strategy is used than when a lump sum compensation strategy is used. 
 
A 2×2 ANOVA was conducted to evaluate the effects of two industry project types (heavy industrial 
and light industrial) and two compensation strategies (lump sum and reimbursable) on “Procurement 
Duration.” The means and standard deviations for each of the combination groups are presented in Table 
7. The results for the ANOVA indicated a non-significant main effect for industry project type (p = 0.13 > p 
= 0.05), which means that the industry project type alone (heavy industrial or light industrial) does not 
have a significant effect on “Procurement Duration.” It also indicated a non-significant main effect for 
compensation strategy (p = 0.30 > p = 0.05), which means that the type of compensation strategy alone 
(lump sum or reimbursable) does not have a significant effect on “Procurement Duration.”  However, the 
results indicated a significant interaction between industry project type and compensation strategy (p < 
0.001), which means the average “Procurement Duration” for heavy and light industrial projects is 
significantly different for lump sum and reimbursable compensation strategies. In fact, an examination of 
the means in Table 7 indicates that for heavy industrial projects, the mean “Procurement Duration” for 
projects that use a reimbursable compensation strategy is shorter than for projects that use a lump sum 
compensation strategy. But for light industrial projects, the trend is the reverse: the mean “Procurement 
Duration” for projects that use a reimbursable compensation strategy is longer than for projects that use a 
lump sum compensation strategy. Therefore, the type of compensation strategy implemented may 
influence the “Procurement Duration” differently for heavy and light industrial projects, and, consequently, 
a statistical test was performed to determine whether the duration is significantly shorter for heavy 
industrial projects that used reimbursable compensation strategies and whether the duration is 
significantly longer for light industrial projects that used reimbursable compensation strategies.    
 
Table 7. Mean and Standard Deviation for Procurement Duration (in weeks) 
Industry Group Compensation Strategy Mean SD 
Heavy Industrial Lump Sum 77 32 
 Reimbursable 55 27 
Light Industrial Lump Sum 39 22 
 Reimbursable 74 29 
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To examine whether the difference in the average “Procurement Duration” was statistically shorter for 
heavy industrial projects that implemented reimbursable versus lump sum compensation strategies, the 
simple main effect of compensation strategy on average “Procurement Duration” was examined using a 
within-group analysis approach. The significance level was reduced to 0.025 to control for Type I error, 
and the analysis indicated that the difference in the “Procurement Duration” for heavy industrial projects 
that implemented reimbursable versus lump sum compensation strategies was, in fact, statistically shorter 
(p = 0.006 < p = 0.025). This finding thus supports Hypothesis 3.  
A similar analysis was conducted to determine whether the difference in the average “Procurement 
Duration” was statistically longer for light industrial projects that implemented reimbursable versus lump 
sum compensation strategies, and the analysis indicated that the difference in the average “Procurement 
Duration” for light industrial projects that implemented reimbursable versus lump sum compensation 
strategies was, in fact, statistically longer (p < 0.001 < p = 0.025).  
Overall, the analysis indicated that the type of compensation strategy implemented on both heavy 
and light industrial projects had a significant impact on “Procurement Duration,” where reimbursable 
compensation resulted in a shorter duration on heavy industrial projects and a longer duration on light 
industrial projects. 
 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): “Construction Duration” is shorter when a reimbursable compensation 
strategy is used rather than when a lump sum compensation strategy is used. 
 
A 2×2 ANOVA was conducted to evaluate the effects of two industry project types (heavy industrial 
and light industrial) and two compensation strategies (lump sum and reimbursable) on “Construction 
Duration.” The means and standard deviations for each of the combination groups are presented in Table 
8. The results for the ANOVA indicated a non-significant main effect for industry project type (p = 0.48 > p 
= 0.05), which means that the type of project alone (heavy or light industrial) does not have a significant 
effect on “Construction Duration.” The results also indicated a non-significant main effect for 
compensation strategy (p = 0.13 > p = 0.05), which means that the type of compensation strategy alone 
(lump sum or reimbursable) does not have a significant effect on “Construction Duration.” However, the 
results indicated a significant interaction between industry project type and compensation strategy (p < 
0.001), which means the average “Construction Duration” for heavy and light industrial projects is 
significantly different for projects that implemented a lump sum versus a reimbursable compensation 
strategy. An examination of the means in Table 7 indicates that for heavy industrial projects, the average 
“Construction Duration” for projects that implemented a reimbursable compensation strategy is shorter 
than for projects that implemented a lump sum strategy, but for light industrial projects, the trend is the 
reverse: the average “Construction Duration” for projects that implemented a reimbursable compensation 
strategy is longer than for projects that implemented a lump sum strategy. Therefore, the type of 
compensation strategy implemented may influence the “Construction Duration” differently for heavy and 
light industrial projects, and, consequently, a statistical test was performed to determine whether the 
duration is significantly shorter for heavy industrial projects that used reimbursable compensation 
strategies and whether the duration is significantly longer for light industrial projects that used 
reimbursable compensation strategies.    
To examine whether the difference in the average “Construction Duration” was statistically shorter for 
heavy industrial projects that implemented reimbursable versus lump sum compensation strategies, the 
simple main effect of compensation strategy on average “Construction Duration” was examined using a 
within-group analysis approach. The significance level was again reduced to 0.025 to control for Type I 
error, and the analysis indicated that the difference in the “Construction Duration” for heavy industrial 
projects that implemented reimbursable versus lump sum compensation strategies was, in fact, 
statistically shorter (p < 0.001), thus supporting Hypothesis 4.  
A similar analysis was conducted to determine whether the difference in the average “Construction 
Duration” was statistically longer for light industrial projects that implemented reimbursable versus lump 
sum compensation strategies, and no statistically significant difference was noted (p = 0.14 > p = 0.025).  
Consequently, the average “Construction Duration” is similar, rather than different, on light industrial 
projects that implemented reimbursable and lump sum compensation strategies.  
Overall, the analysis indicated that the type of compensation strategy implemented on heavy 
industrial projects had a significant impact on “Construction Duration,” where reimbursable compensation 
resulted in a shorter duration. 
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Table 8. Mean and Standard Deviation for Construction Duration (in weeks) 
Industry Group Compensation Strategy Mean SD 
Heavy Industrial Lump Sum 91 32 
 Reimbursable 58 28 
Light Industrial Lump Sum 61 36 
 Reimbursable 76 28 
   
4. Discussion 
There is a pervasive belief in both the heavy and light industrial construction sectors that a reimbursable 
compensation strategy may facilitate a shorter project duration (Menches and Chen 2011), but, until now, 
this theory has never been empirically tested. Consequently, the study reported here empirically 
compared lump sum and reimbursable compensation strategies to determine if a reimbursable 
compensation strategy is more conducive to shortening a project’s duration than a lump sum strategy. 
This issue is important because many projects rely on speed-to-market to gain a competitive advantage 
by introducing new products and services before their competitors. Furthermore, a longer project duration 
exposes a company to unexpected increases in material and labor costs, labor shortages, currency rate 
fluctuations, and a host of other unforeseen circumstances. Hence, most companies would like to 
complete projects as soon as feasibly possible. The analysis results are summarized in Table 9 and 
discussed in the next few paragraphs. 
 
4.1. Heavy Industrial Projects 
The data suggest that heavy industrial projects, such as oil refineries or liquefied natural gas plants, that 
implemented a reimbursable compensation strategy did, in fact, achieve a statistically shorter 
procurement and construction duration and, thus, a statistically shorter overall project duration than 
projects that implemented a lump sum strategy. However, the detailed design duration was not 
statistically different regardless of whether a reimbursable or lump sum compensation strategy was 
implemented.  These findings are consistent with Hypothesis 1 (“Overall Project Duration” is shorter when 
a reimbursable compensation strategy is used than when a lump sum compensation strategy is used), 
Hypothesis 3 (“Procurement Duration” is shorter when a reimbursable compensation strategy is used than 
when a lump sum compensation strategy is used), and Hypothesis 4 (“Construction Duration” is shorter 
when a reimbursable compensation strategy is used rather than when a lump sum compensation strategy 
is used) but do not support Hypothesis 2 (“Detailed Design Duration” is longer when a reimbursable 
compensation strategy is used rather than when a lump sum compensation strategy is used). Experts 
(both owners and contractors) who manage heavy industrial projects were consulted to identify plausible 
reasons why the procurement, construction and overall project durations were shorter for heavy industrial 
projects that implemented a reimbursable compensation strategy and why there was no different in 
design duration regardless of whether a lump sum or reimbursable contracting strategy was used.  
Design Duration. The experts suggested that there might be more than one plausible explanation for 
“no difference” in design duration for reimbursable and lump sum compensation strategies. For example, 
one expert suggested that the design duration might actually consume more resources in a reimbursable 
environment – that is, the duration would be longer under a reimbursable contract, as hypothesized, 
except that the contractor can add more people to complete the design in a shorter length of time 
because the owner will reimburse all direct labor costs. Furthermore, under a lump sum strategy, the 
contractor is at risk for all design costs; therefore, the contractor will carefully control design duration in 
order to control labor costs. Under these two scenarios, a statistical analysis would likely result in a 
finding of “no difference” in design duration regardless of compensation strategy.  
Procurement Duration. One expert suggested that a reimbursable compensation strategy often allows 
the contractor to utilize a greater number of procurement specialists who can thus purchase materials and 
equipment at a relatively faster pace than might be possible if a lump sum strategy had been used. 
Therefore, when materials and equipment can be delivered to the site earlier, then construction can start 
and finish earlier, and products can be brought to market sooner. Another expert suggested that 45% of 
the total project cost is often spent on materials and equipment, and therefore, a compensation strategy 
that places the contractor at risk for all project costs (such as a lump sum strategy) often leads the 
contractor to spend much more time receiving and reviewing bids so that the lowest price can be obtained 
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from subcontractors and vendors. This ultimately causes the procurement duration to be longer in a lump 
sum compensation environment. 
 
Table 9. Summary of Results 




Heavy Industrial Projects 
Overall Project Duration Lump Sum Longer Reimbursable Shorter 
Detailed Design Duration Lump Sum Equal Reimbursable Equal 
Procurement Duration Lump Sum Longer Reimbursable Shorter 
Construction Duration Lump Sum Longer Reimbursable Shorter 
Light Industrial Projects 
Overall Project Duration Lump Sum Equal Reimbursable Equal 
Detailed Design Duration Lump Sum Shorter Reimbursable Longer 
Procurement Duration Lump Sum Shorter Reimbursable Longer 
Construction Duration Lump Sum Equal Reimbursable Equal 
 
Construction Duration. More than one expert suggested that the primary reason that the construction 
duration is shorter in a reimbursable environment is because the contractor is willing to supply as many 
resources as necessary to meet aggressive schedule goals as long as the client is willing to pay for all 
direct labor and material costs. Furthermore, on lump sum projects, the contractor is at risk for all project 
costs and is thus driven to control costs by controlling the amount of resources allocated to the project. In 
this environment, the focus is on completing the project on time rather than completing the project in a 
shorter length of time.  
Overall Project Duration. Logically, if there is no statistical different in design duration under a lump 
sum or reimbursable compensation strategy but both the procurement duration and construction duration 
are shorter in a reimbursable environment, then the overall project duration is also prone to be shorter 
under a reimbursable strategy. 
 
4.2. Light Industrial Projects 
The overwhelming majority (57%) of the light industrial projects examined for this study were from the 
pharmaceutical industry. Consequently, experts in the pharmaceutical industry were consulted about the 
research findings. The data suggest that light industrial projects, such as a drug development center or 
medical equipment manufacturing plant, that implemented a reimbursable compensation strategy did not 
achieve a statistically shorter procurement, construction, or overall project duration than projects that 
implemented a lump sum strategy. In fact, the construction duration and overall project duration were 
similar for projects that implemented lump sum and reimbursable compensation strategies.  However, the 
detailed design duration and procurement duration were statistically longer for projects that implemented 
a reimbursable compensation strategy and statistically shorter for projects that implemented a lump sum 
compensation strategy.  These findings are consistent with Hypothesis 2 but do not support Hypothesis 1, 
Hypothesis 3, or Hypothesis 4. Experts who manage light industrial (i.e., primarily pharmaceutical) 
projects were consulted to identify plausible reasons why the design and procurement duration were 
longer under a reimbursable contracting strategy, while there was no statistical difference in construction 
or overall project duration regardless of compensation strategy.  
Design Duration. More than one expert suggested that one reason the design duration is longer 
under a reimbursable contracting strategy is because there is no incentive to stop designing when the 
owner is paying all of the direct labor costs. Furthermore, technology changes at such a fast pace in the 
pharmaceutical industry that the design often changes frequently to accommodate the latest technology, 
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thus slowing down the process of completing the design. Finally, the engineers are often given 
tremendous latitude when designing new pharmaceutical technology; as a result, they tend to “tinker” – 
essentially experimenting with a number of different designs, allowing the design to slowly evolve through 
iteration – which slows down the design process. However, under a lump sum compensation strategy, the 
contractor is responsible for all design costs and, as such, has an incentive to complete the design as 
quickly and efficiently as possible to keep costs at a minimum. 
Procurement Duration. One expert suggested that the reason the procurement duration is longer 
under a reimbursable compensation strategy is because a reimbursable procurement process is nearly 
always associated with a reimbursable design process. Given that the design tends to evolve – 
experiencing numerous changes during the course of the design process – the frequent changes to the 
design cause a slowing down of the procurement of materials and equipment. Thus, the two processes 
are linked. Likewise, under a lump sum design process, the contractor is likely to complete the design in a 
timely manner to control costs, and a timely design completion facilitates a timely procurement process. 
Thus, the procurement duration may be shorter under a lump sum strategy because no additional 
changes occur, and hence complete information is available for purchasing the required materials, 
equipment, and technology.  
Construction Duration. One expert suggested that a plausible explanation for why there is no 
difference in construction duration regardless of whether a lump sum or reimbursable compensation 
strategy is implemented is because the owner may be waiting on regulatory approval for the 
pharmaceutical product that will be produced inside the facility. Construction may be implemented while 
the owner is awaiting regulatory approval, but the owner is essentially proceeding “with caution but as 
planned” rather than accelerating the construction duration. A lack of regulatory approval will significantly 
slow down construction efforts.  
Overall Project Duration. One expert suggested a plausible explanation for why there is no difference 
in overall project duration regardless of whether a lump sum or reimbursable compensation strategy is 
implemented: the detailed design duration and procurement duration are both shorter in a lump sum 
environment, but they are longer in a reimbursable environment. However, the construction duration is 
statistically equal for projects that implement either a lump sum or a reimbursable compensation strategy. 
Hence, because the construction phase often overlaps the detailed design and procurement phases on a 
reimbursable project, the net effect is that the overall project duration is statistically equal for lump sum 
and reimbursable projects. 
  
4.3. Discussion Conclusion  
Heavy industrial projects that are time-driven should consider implementing a reimbursable 
compensation strategy because evidence suggests that this strategy tends to shorten a project’s duration. 
However, light industrial projects may not gain a significant time advantage by implementing a 
reimbursable compensation strategy, and other factors might need to be considered when trying to 
choose between reimbursable and lump sum strategies, such as the need for pre-construction services or 
the need/desire to start construction before the design is fully complete, which is feasible if a 
reimbursable compensation strategy is selected. 
 
5. Limitations, Summary, and Future Research 
The results of the study presented in this article provide empirical evidence that using a reimbursable 
compensation strategy can potentially shorten the procurement duration, construction duration, and 
overall project duration of heavy industrial projects. However, reimbursable contracting did not appear to 
reduce the project duration on light industrial projects. Hence, these findings partially support long-held 
beliefs that reimbursable contracts are suitable for use on schedule-driven projects. While the results of 
this analysis are interesting, the study has several limitations that should be kept in mind when 
interpreting the results, and suggestions are presented here for expanding this line of analysis. 
Because a specific analysis was not conducted for building and infrastructure industry types, it is not 
clear whether building and infrastructure projects tend to resemble light industrial or heavy industrial 
projects. No conclusions can be drawn about the relationship between duration and compensation 
strategy for these two industry types. Furthermore, analyses of the project definition phase and 
commissioning phase were not conducted as part of this study. Hence, no conclusions can be drawn 
about the relationship between duration and compensation strategy for these two phases of the extended 
project lifecycle. 
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One additional direction for future research that would be beneficial to industry and academic 
institutions is to investigate the influence that equal or shorter durations have on project costs in a 
reimbursable environment. One lingering unanswered question is whether a shorter duration comes at a 
higher cost because additional labor and materials were needed to achieve the shorter schedule. This, 
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